




Abstract:	The	Problem	of	Overlappers	 is	a	puzzle	about	what	makes	 it	 the	case,	and	how	we	can	know,	that	we	have	the	parts	we	intuitively	think	we	have.	In	this	paper,	I	develop	and	motivate	an	overlooked	solution	to	this	puzzle.	According	to	what	 I	 call	 the	 self-making	 view	 it	 is	within	 certain	 constraints	 in	 our	power	 to	decide	what	we	refer	to	with	the	personal	pronoun	‘I’,	so	the	truth	of	most	of	our	beliefs	about	our	parts	is	ensured	by	the	very	mechanism	of	self-reference.	Other	than	providing	 an	 elegant	 solution	 to	 the	Problem	of	Overlappers,	 the	 view	 can	also	 be	 motivated	 on	 independent	 grounds.	 It	 also	 has	 wide-ranging	consequences	for	how	we	should	be	thinking	about	persons.	Among	other	things,	it	can	help	undermine	an	influential	line	of	argument	against	the	permissibility	of	elective	 amputation.	 After	 a	 detailed	 discussion	 and	 defence	 of	 the	 self-making	view,	I	consider	some	objections	to	it.	I	conclude	that	none	of	these	objections	is	persuasive	and	we	should	at	the	very	least	take	seriously	the	idea	that	we	are	to	some	extent	self-made.	
	
	
1.	Overpopulation	puzzles	and	the	metaphysics	of	persons	I	 am	 a	 person:	 a	 conscious,	 rational,	 thinking	 being.	 I	 also	 have	 various	 parts:	 feet,	hands,	 nose,	 ears,	 and	 so	 on.	Moreover,	 I	 have	 parts	 that	 are	 or	 involve	my	 ‘thinking	parts’:	brain,	head,	and	things	without	a	conventional	name	in	English,	for	example	my	‘nose-complement’	(a	part	 that	 includes	all	of	me	except	 for	my	nose).	For	the	sake	of	vividness,	 focus	 on	 my	 nose-complement.	 My	 nose-complement	 has	 everything	intrinsically	required	for	personhood:	it	has	a	working	brain	with	the	capacity	to	sustain	a	complex	mental	life.	Worse	yet,	it	has	my	brain,	which	makes	it	an	excellent	candidate	for	thinking	just	what	I	think.	But	if	my	nose-complement	thinks	of	itself	what	I	think	of	myself,	it	is	badly	mistaken.	It	is	plausibly	not	a	person,	and	it	certainly	does	not	have	a	nose.	Unfortunately,	things	seem	to	my	nose-complement	exactly	the	way	they	seem	to	me.	What	makes	it	the	case,	then,	that	in	referring	to	myself	I	refer	to	a	person	and	not	to	 a	 nose-complement?	 And	 how	 can	 I	 know	 that	 I	 am	 a	 person	 and	 not	 a	 nose-complement?	This	 is	 one	 of	 the	many	 overpopulation	 puzzles	widely	 discussed	 in	 the	 personal	identity	 literature.	 However,	 my	 cursory	 presentation	 lumped	 together	 two	 different	problems	that	ought	to	be	distinguished.	For	clarity’s	sake,	let	me	introduce	some	fresh	terminology	for	them.	The	first	problem	I	shall	call	the	Problem	of	Almost-Persons.	Here,	we	assume	at	the	outset	that	even	if	our	large	composite	proper	parts	are	very	similar	to	persons,	they	nevertheless	fail	to	be	persons.	This	does	not	automatically	answer	the	following	 question:	What	makes	 it	 the	 case	 that	when	 I	 use	 the	word	 ‘I’,	 I	 refer	 to	 a	
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person?	I	put	the	question	in	linguistic	terms,	but	there	is	an	equally	pressing	question	about	‘I’-thoughts.	If	I	share	my	place	with	highly	person-like	entities	that	ultimately	fail	to	be	persons,	then	what	makes	it	the	case	that	my	‘I’-thoughts	pick	out	a	person,	rather	than	 any	 of	 these	 non-persons?	 These	 questions	 have	 a	 distinctively	 metaphysical	flavour,	but	the	Problem	of	Almost-Persons	also	has	an	epistemological	side:	how	can	I	
know	that	I	am	a	person?	Whatever	reasons	I	could	cite	for	thinking	that	I	am	a	person,	are	 also	 available	 to	 the	non-persons	 overlapping	with	me.	But	 if	 they	 think	 they	 are	persons,	 they	 are	wrong.	 And	 since	 I	 have	 no	 rational	 basis	 to	 tell	myself	 apart	 from	them,	apparently	I	cannot	know	that	I	am	a	person.	The	second	problem,	which	we	could	call	 the	Problem	of	Overlappers,	 requires	no	specific	assumption	about	personhood.	Never	mind	if	my	nose-complement	is	a	person.	I	 firmly	 believe	 that	 I	 am	 not	 a	 nose-complement;	 I	 have	 the	 boundaries	 of	 a	 human	being	 and	 not	 those	 of	 a	 proper	 part	 of	 a	 human	 being.	 To	 borrow	 a	 pair	 of	 useful	expressions	 from	Madden	(forthcoming),	 I	am	a	humanoid,	 something	 that	has	human	
form.	When	I	refer	to	myself	and	entertain	various	beliefs	about	what	parts	I	have,	these	are	 normally	 true	 beliefs	 about	 a	 humanoid,	 not	 false	 beliefs	 about	 something	 that	overlaps	with	 a	 humanoid	 (an	 overlapper,	 to	 borrow	 another	 handy	 expression	 from	Madden).	For	instance,	when	I	utter	the	sentence	‘I	have	a	nose’	and	think	the	thought	expressed	by	it,	I	say	and	think	something	true	about	a	humanoid;	I	do	not	say	and	think	something	 false	about	a	nose-complement.	But	why	 is	 this	 so?	This	puzzle	 too	has	an	equally	 pressing	 epistemological	 aspect.	 If	 I	 think	 I	 have	 a	 nose	 and	 my	 nose-complement	thinks	that	it	has	a	nose,	one	of	us	is	mistaken.	But	how	can	I	know	that	I	am	not	the	one	who	is	mistaken?	More	generally:	how	can	I	know	that	I	have	roughly	the	parts	I	think	I	have	and	am	not	an	overlapper	with	a	different	set	of	parts?1	The	 two	 problems	 are	 often	 discussed	 together,	 but	 they	 importantly	 differ:	 the	Problem	 of	 Overlappers	 is	 about	 our	 parts,	 while	 the	 Problem	 of	 Almost-Persons	 is	about	our	status	as	persons.	Despite	this	difference,	the	two	problems	are	importantly	related	in	the	following	way.	One	may	reasonably	suppose	that	no	acceptable	solution	to	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	can	deny	that	we	are	persons;	it	cannot	turn	out	that	when	self-referring,	 some	 of	 us	 refer	 to	 non-persons.	 Call	 this	 the	 Person	 Constraint.	 The	Person	 Constraint	 is	 highly	 plausible	 and	 suggests	 that	 the	 two	 problems	 are	 best	approached	 together.	To	recap,	 this	means	 that	we	need	 to	answer	 the	 following	 four	questions:	 (a)	 what	 makes	 it	 the	 case	 that	 our	 ‘I’-thoughts	 and	 utterances	 pick	 out	persons?	(b)	How	can	we	know	that	they	pick	out	persons?	(c)	What	makes	it	the	case	that	 they	 typically	 pick	 out	 things	with	 roughly	 the	 parts	 that	we	 think	we	have?	 (d)	How	 can	we	normally	 know	 that	 they	pick	 out	 things	with	 roughly	 the	parts	 that	we	think	we	have?	The	 rest	 of	 this	 paper	will	 focus	mostly	 on	 questions	 (c)	 and	 (d),	 the	
                                                1	The	Problem	of	Overlappers	is	more	or	 less	what	Madden	(forthcoming)	calls	the	problem	of	thinking	parts.	 I	still	prefer	my	terminology	because	Madden’s	 label	suggests	that	when	self-referring	we	always	pick	out	the	largest	candidate,	which	has	all	the	other	candidates	as	proper	parts.	As	should	be	obvious	from	the	discussion	 to	 follow,	 I	believe	 this	assumption	 to	be	 false.	For	more	on	 these	puzzles,	 see	van	Inwagen	 1981,	 Olson	 1995,	 2007,	 Merricks	 1998,	 Hawley	 1998,	 Sider	 2001b,	 2003,	 Burke	 2003,	Zimmerman	2003a,	Hershenov	2005,	Hudson	2007,	D.	Kovacs	2010,	and	Sutton	2014.	
 3 
metaphysical	 and	 the	 epistemological	 aspects	 of	 the	 Problem	 of	 Overlappers.	 But	 in	some	 detail	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 to	 also	 discuss	 the	 Problem	 of	 Almost-Persons.	 The	reasons	for	this	are	two.	First,	I	want	to	show	that	there	is	a	unified	solution	to	the	two	problems.	Second,	I	want	to	show	that	while	my	solution	to	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	is	quite	unorthodox,	it	honours	the	Person	Constraint.	The	 two	 problems	 also	 share	 an	 important	 common	 feature:	 they	 make	 no	assumption	about	uniqueness	or	referential	 indeterminacy.	As	 I	 stated	 them,	both	are	concerned	with	why	we	are,	 and	how	we	 can	know	 that	we	are,	 entities	with	 certain	features.	They	assume	neither	 that	exactly	one	person-candidate	 is	a	person,	nor	 that	every	token	of	‘I’	determinately	refers	to	one	person-candidate.	This	is	no	accident.	The	Problem	 of	 Almost-Persons	 and	 the	 Problem	 of	 Overlappers	 are	 puzzles	 about	 self-reference	and	as	such	are	specific	to	conscious,	rational,	thinking	beings.	But	there	is	a	completely	 general	puzzle,	Unger’s	 (1980)	 famous	Problem	of	 the	Many,	which	arises	for	 all	material	 objects,	 including	 persons.2	 It	 is	 not	 entirely	 uncontroversial	what	 the	problem	exactly	is,	but	the	phenomenon	of	boundary-vagueness	plays	a	central	role	in	it.	Take,	for	instance,	any	ordinary	chair.	It	is	not	clear	where	the	boundaries	of	the	chair	are:	there	are	mereological	sums	that	do	and	largely	overlapping	sums	that	do	not	have	certain	particles	around	the	outskirts	of	the	chair.	What	prevents	all	those	mereological	sums	from	being	chairs?	And	even	if	exactly	one	of	them	is	a	chair,	which	one	is	that?	At	least	in	part,	this	is	a	problem	about	referential	indeterminacy:	we	intuitively	think	that	when	attempting	to	refer	to	a	material	object	of	kind	K	we	determinately	refer	to	exactly	one	K;	moreover,	we	take	ourselves	to	know	which	K	we	are	referring	to.	The	Problem	of	 the	 Many	 threatens	 to	 show	 otherwise.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 make	 it	 clear	 that	 the	Problem	of	Overlappers	and	the	Problem	of	Almost-Persons	do	not	concern	boundary-vagueness,	and	 they	 threaten	not	with	referential	 indeterminacy	but	with	widespread	and	massive	error.	In	the	actual	world,	where	boundary-vagueness	is	rampant,	it	is	easy	to	mistake	 these	problems	 for	 a	 special	 instance	of	 the	Problem	of	 the	Many.	But	 the	problems	differ	both	in	source	and	in	scope	and	should	not	be	confused.3	The	rest	of	the	paper	will	proceed	as	follows.	In	section	2	I	will	present	two	general	approaches	 to	 the	 problems:	 deflationist	 and	 heavyweight	 views.	 In	 section	 3,	 I	 will	introduce	my	preferred	variety	of	deflationism,	 the	 self-making	view:	 roughly,	 our	 ‘I’-thoughts	 and	 utterances	 automatically	 pick	 out	 the	 best	 candidate	 referent	 in	 our	vicinity.	The	view	borrows	a	familiar	idea	from	Harold	Noonan	(1998):	when	using	the	word	‘I’	only	persons	refer	to	themselves,	while	non-persons	refer	to	the	persons	they	overlap	 with.	 As	 we	 shall	 see,	 the	 self-making	 view	 provides	 a	 nice	 solution	 to	 the	
                                                2	See	especially	Hudson	2001:	Ch.	1–2.	3	 The	 two	 problems	 should	 also	 be	 distinguished	 from	 overpopulation	 puzzles	 that	 have	 to	 do	 with	
coincident,	 rather	 than	merely	overlapping,	person-candidates:	 the	Problem	of	 the	Thinking	Animal	 for	non-animalist	theories	of	personal	identity	and	the	“revenge	problems”	that	target	animalism.	For	these	puzzles,	 see	 Snowdon	 1990,	 Olson	 1997a,	 Noonan	 1998,	 Shoemaker	 1999,	 Baker	 2000:	 207–208,	Robinson	 2006:	 255–8,	 Johnston	 2007,	 Árnadóttir	 2010,	 and	 Parfit	 2012.	 Unlike	 these	 puzzles,	 the	Problem	 of	 Overlappers	 and	 the	 Problem	 of	 Almost-Persons	 arise	 for	 any	 metaphysic	 of	 persons	according	to	which	we	have	“thinking	parts”.	
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Problem	of	Overlappers	but	can	also	be	motivated	by	independent	considerations	about	demonstratives	 and	mental	 content.	 It	 also	 has	 some	 surprising	 (though	 to	my	mind	attractive)	 consequences,	 which	 will	 be	 spelled	 out	 in	 section	 4.	 In	 section	 5	 I	 will	address	several	objections.	I	will	argue	that	none	of	them	are	compelling,	and	we	should	treat	 the	 self-making	 view	 as	 a	 serious	 and	 largely	 overlooked	 competitor	 in	 the	metaphysics	of	persons.		
2.	Two	approaches	to	the	puzzles	How	 should	 we	 go	 about	 solving	 the	 puzzles?	 Two	 broad	 strategies	 recommend	themselves.	 (The	 literature	 rarely	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 Problem	 of	 Almost-Persons	and	the	Problem	of	Overlappers,	and	in	presenting	the	two	strategies	I	will	not	pay	too	much	attention	to	the	distinction	either.	I	will	be	more	careful	when	presenting	my	own	view.)	
Heavyweight	 approaches	 attempt	 to	 find	 some	 metaphysically	 significant	 feature	that	distinguishes	persons	 from	their	overlappers.	The	 feature	most	obviously	coming	to	mind	is	existence:	perhaps	the	problematic	parts	do	not	even	exist.	One	may	get	rid	of	nose-complements	and	their	kin	by	rejecting	the	Remainder	Principle	(RP),	according	to	which	 for	any	x	 and	y,	 if	x	 is	 a	proper	part	of	y	 then	 there	 is	 a	z	 composed	exactly	of	those	parts	of	y	 that	do	not	overlap	x	 (Simons	1987,	p.	88).	But	 in	 itself,	 this	will	not	solve	 the	 puzzles;	 one	 would	 also	 need	 to	 eliminate	 composite	 proper	 parts	 whose	existence	is	independently	plausible,	such	as	brains,	heads	and	upper	parts	(those	that	sculptors	represent	with	a	bust).4		An	alternative	heavyweight	strategy	is	to	accept	the	existence	of	overlappers	but	maintain	 that	 they	 lack	some	 intrinsic	property	 required	for	 personhood.	 Perhaps	 a	 thing’s	 mental	 properties	 do	 not	 supervene	 on	 the	microphysical	properties	of	 its	parts,	so	our	overlappers	do	not	 intrinsically	qualify	as	persons	 (Merricks	 1998).	 Or	 perhaps	 their	 parts	 lack	 certain	 natural	 functions	necessary	for	personhood	(Madden	forthcoming).	Either	way,	heavyweight	approaches	contend	 that	 the	 problematic	 person-candidates	 do	 not	 enjoy	 our	 metaphysically	distinguished	status.	By	contrast,	deflationist	approaches	posit	no	deep	metaphysical	difference	between	us	and	our	overlappers	and	suggest	instead	that	some	general	facts	about	the	workings	of	thought	and	language	guarantee	that	when	self-referring,	we	refer	to	things	with	the	right	parts.	These	views	are	naturally	paired	with	a	more	general	deflationist	attitude	to	the	 metaphysics	 of	 persons:	 	 the	 underlying	 thought	 is	 that	 most	 philosophical	questions	about	people	are	primarily	conceptual	questions.5	This	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	the	traditional	puzzles	surrounding	persons	are	philosophically	unimportant.	Sider,	 for	example,	argues	 that	 the	problem	of	personal	 identity	 is	 ‘conceptually	deep,	even	if	metaphysically	shallow’	(2011,	p.	74):	theorizing	about	persons	may	shed	light	
                                                4	For	this	reason,	Olson	(1995)	concludes	that	we	have	no	composite	proper	parts	at	all.	5	I	am	deliberately	being	somewhat	vague	here,	since	the	view	comes	in	so	many	different	versions.	See,	among	 others,	 Lewis	 1976,	 Nozick	 1981,	 Hirsch	 1982:	 Ch.	 10,	 Parfit	 1984,	 Unger	 1990,	 Rovane	 1998,	Sidelle	1999,	Sider	2001a,	and	Eklund	2004.	
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on	crucial	concepts	like	deliberation	and	moral	responsibility	but	will	not	reveal	much	about	the	fundamental	structure	of	the	world.6	As	 of	 today,	 the	 most	 popular	 deflationist	 view	 about	 personal	 identity	 is	
conventionalism.	 A	 natural	 conventionalist	 approach	 to	 overpopulation	 puzzles	would	be	that	something	about	the	meaning	of	the	predicate	‘is	a	person’	guarantees	that	our	self-referential	 attempts	 latch	on	 to	 things	with	 the	 features	we	normally	 attribute	 to	them.	 A	 thoroughly	 public	 version	 of	 conventionalism	 would	 emphasize	 the	 role	 of	
social	 conventions.	 For	 instance,	 perhaps	 personhood	 is	 a	 maximal	 concept:	 the	predicate	‘is	a	person’	is	not	applicable	to	proper	parts	of	persons.7	A	different	kind	of	conventionalism	 may	 allow	 that	 different	 speakers	 have	 slightly	 different	 concepts	corresponding	to	the	same	linguistic	expression.8	Both	kinds	of	conventionalism	should	be	 distinguished	 from	 a	 much	 more	 radical	 view,	 according	 to	 which	 persons	 are	conventional	 constructs	 that	 depend	 for	 their	 existence	 on	 social	 conventions.9	Conventionalism	as	I	understand	it	makes	no	such	claim.	It	contends	merely	that	it	is	a	matter	 of	 convention	 which	 mind-independently	 existing	 things	 count	 as	 persons;	which	things	exists	is	not	(cf.	Olson	1997b,	pp.	156–9	and	Merricks	2001,	p.	175).	In	 this	 paper,	 I	 will	 not	 discuss	 the	 standard	 versions	 of	 deflationism,	 nor	 will	 I	criticize	 their	heavyweight	alternatives.	 Instead,	 I	wish	 to	propose	a	novel	deflationist	view	and	argue	that	we	have	reasons	to	take	it	seriously.	According	to	the	picture	I	shall	advocate,	we	 are	 partially	 self-made.	 By	 the	 claim	 that	we	 are	 self-made	 I	 only	mean	something	analogous	to	the	social	conventionalist	view:	within	some	yet	to	be	specified	constraints	it	is	up	to	us	what	we	refer	to	with	the	personal	pronoun	‘I’,	but	it	is	not	up	to	us	what	exists	or	what	is	a	candidate	referent	of	our	use	of	‘I’.	The	self-making	view,	as	I	shall	call	it,	yields	a	nice	solution	to	the	Problem	of	Overlappers:	when	I	think	that	I	have	a	leg,	my	belief	is	automatically	true	because	for	any	candidate	referent	that	lacks	a	leg,	there	is	a	better	candidate	that	has	one.	The	view	is	in	part	inspired	by,	and	works	best	in	tandem	with,	a	theory	of	Harold	Noonan’s	(1998)	that	has	come	to	be	known	as	Personal	Pronoun	Revisionism	(PPR).	(I	adopt	this	name	with	some	hesitation,	since	it	is	 not	 obvious	 that	 the	 view	 is	 genuinely	 revisionary	 in	 character.)	 According	 to	 PPR,	only	persons	can	use	the	word	‘I’	to	refer	to	themselves;	non-persons	can	use	it	only	to	refer	to	the	person	they	overlap	with.	Armed	with	PPR,	the	self-making	view	solves	both	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	and	the	Problem	of	Almost-Persons:	when	self-referring,	we	
                                                6	 The	 division	 between	 heavyweight	 and	 deflationist	 views	 is	 not	 necessarily	 sharp.	 According	 to	reference	 magnetism,	 a	 view	 inspired	 by	 Lewis	 1983,	 meaning	 is	 determined	 by	 use	 and	 intrinsic	eligibility.	One	might	think	that	various	questions	about	the	metaphysics	of	persons	turn	on	the	meaning	of	 the	 predicate	 ‘is	 a	 person’,	 which	 is	 determined	 by	what	 strikes	 the	 best	 balance	 between	 use	 and	eligibility.	 Sider	 (2001a),	 who	 is	 otherwise	 sympathetic	 to	 magnetism,	 considers	 and	 rejects	 its	application	to	personal	identity.	(I	refer	to	magnetism	merely	as	a	view	inspired	by	Lewis,	since	it	remains	controversial	whether	Lewis	himself	ever	endorsed	it;	see	Weatherson	2013	and	Schwarz	2014.)	7	 See	 Burke	 1994	 and	 Sider	 2001b,	 2003.	 Note	 that	 the	 maximality	 principle	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 full	solution,	since	 it	does	not	 imply	 that	my	nose-complement	 is	not	a	person.	 It	 implies	merely	 that	 if	 the	human	organism	I	think	I	am	is	a	person,	then	my	nose-complement	is	not	(cf.	Olson	1995).	8	This	is	Jackson’s	(1998)	general	view	about	linguistic	meaning.	9	See	Braddon-Mitchell	and	Miller	2004	and	Miller	2013	for	this	view.	
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automatically	refer	to	things	that	satisfy	most	of	our	‘I’-thoughts,	and	since	these	things	‘I’-referents,	they	are	automatically	persons.	The	self-making	view	is	not	without	predecessors.	Other	philosophers	have	argued	that	the	kinds	of	changes	a	person	can	survive	depend	on	that	person’s	self-conception	(Nozick	 (1981,	 p.	 60)	 or	 her	 concerns	 and	 expectations	 (Johnston	 1989,	 Braddon-Mitchell	 and	 West	 2001).	 However,	 these	 approaches	 importantly	 differ	 from	 mine.	First,	 as	 Eklund	 (2004)	 notes,	 these	 authors	 are	 at	 bottom	 interested	 in	 self-concern	relativism,	the	view	that	the	proper	target	of	our	prudential	concern	is	to	some	extent	up	 to	 us.	 By	 contrast,	my	 interest	 is	 chiefly	metaphysical	 (though	 the	 view	 has	 some	interesting	ethical	consequences,	as	I	will	show	in	section	4).	Moreover,	 these	authors	are	typically	interested	in	persistence	over	time,	an	issue	I	will	have	little	to	say	about	here;	 my	 primary	 concern	 is	 identity	 and	 composition	 at	 a	 time.	 Finally,	 and	 most	importantly,	while	the	view	has	its	predecessors,	the	motivation	I	will	offer	for	it	is,	so	far	 as	 I	 know,	 entirely	 new.	 In	 the	 next	 section	 I	will	 explain	 the	 self-making	 view	 in	more	detail	and	offer	some	reason	to	believe	it.		
3.	The	self-making	view	I	 think	 I	 am	a	humanoid	with	 a	 nose,	 rather	 than	 a	 nose-complement	 embedded	 in	 a	humanoid.	But	of	course,	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	gives	me	pause:	what	makes	it	the	case,	 and	 how	 can	 I	 know,	 that	 I	 thereby	 believe	 something	 true	 about	 a	 humanoid	rather	than	something	false	about	a	nose-complement?	A	deflationist	answer	will	posit	a	 link	 between	 the	 intuitive	 correctness	 of	 such	 beliefs	 and	 the	 mechanism	 of	 self-reference.	The	specific	 link	I	propose	 is	 this:	most	of	our	 ‘I’-thoughts	are	 true	because	they	 automatically	 refer	 to	 a	 candidate	 that	makes	 them	 true.	 Take,	 for	 example,	 the	belief	I	express	when	uttering	the	sentence	‘I	have	a	nose’.	There	are	lots	of	things	here	that	have	a	nose:	a	whole	human	organism,	a	leg-complement,	a	hand-complement,	etc.	Other	things	equal,	these	are	better	candidates	for	being	referred	to	by	my	‘I’-thoughts	than	my	 nose-complement.	 But	 of	 course,	 other	 things	 are	 not	 equal:	 many	 of	 these	candidates	 fare	worse	 than	my	 nose-complement	when	 it	 comes	 to	 beliefs	 about	my	other	parts.	There	is,	however,	a	candidate	that	makes	more	of	my	beliefs	true	than	any	of	my	overlappers,	a	candidate	that	has	all	 the	parts	I	ascribe	to	myself.	Since	there	 is	such	a	candidate,	I	do	have	these	parts;	and	since	I	know	that	there	is	such	a	candidate,	I	know	that	I	have	them.	This	is	why	I	am	(and	I	know	that	I	am)	a	humanoid,	rather	than	a	 noseless	 overlapper.	 In	 a	 slogan	 form:	You	 are	 the	 best	 candidate	 satisfier	 of	 the	 ‘I’-
thoughts	 entertained	 in	 your	 vicinity.	 This	 slogan	 conveys	 the	 gist	 of	 my	 view,	 but	 it	requires	three	qualifications.	First,	 how	 should	 we	 understand	 the	 expression	 ‘the	 ‘I’-thoughts	 entertained	 in	one’s	 vicinity’?	 Importantly,	 on	 my	 proposal,	 when	 I	 believe	 that	 I	 have	 a	 nose,	 my	overlapper	also	believes	that	I	have	a	nose;	it	does	not	believe	that	it	has	a	nose.	There	are	 many	 overlappers	 where	 I	 am,	 but	 when	 entertaining	 ‘I’-thoughts	 they	 are	 all	thinking	of	me;	I,	on	the	other	hand,	am	thinking	of	myself.	While	I	am	happy	to	say	that	my	overlappers	share	my	thoughts,	it	would	be	somewhat	misleading	(though	true)	to	say	 that	 they	 share	 my	 de	 se	 or	 ‘I’-thoughts.	 This	 latter	 claim	 is	 naturally	 read	 as	
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meaning	that	I	and	my	overlappers	believe	the	same	things	of	ourselves.	But	that	is	not	my	view.	My	view	is	that	my	overlappers	have	numerically	the	same	de	se	beliefs	that	I	have,	but	from	their	perspective	these	beliefs	are	not	de	se	at	all;	they	are	beliefs	about	me,	 not	 about	 them.	Hence	 the	 technical	 expression	 ‘’I’-thoughts	 entertained	 in	 one’s	vicinity’.	Second,	 it	 is	 of	 course	 possible	 to	 lack	 knowledge	 about	what	 one’s	 parts	 are	 for	reasons	unrelated	to	the	Problem	of	Overlappers,	even	if	there	is	a	candidate	that	would	make	 the	 requisite	 beliefs	 true.	 Suppose	 I	 hallucinate,	 and	 on	 that	 account	 come	 to	believe,	that	someone	chopped	off	my	right	arm.	Is	my	belief	that	I	have	no	right	arm	a	true	belief	about	an	arm-complement	or	a	false	belief	about	something	that	does	have	a	right	 arm?	 Intuitively	 it	 is	 the	 latter,	 and	 the	 self-making	 view	 should	 not	 predict	otherwise.	The	original	slogan	should	be	amended	to	take	care	of	such	cases.	But	such	an	amendment	is	also	independently	motivated.	The	Problem	of	Overlappers	concerns	an	 essentially	 indexical	 piece	of	 information:	 even	once	 all	 facts	 about	 the	 candidates	and	 their	parts	 are	 settled,	 these	 facts	 still	 do	not	guarantee	 that	 I	 am	not	a	handless	overlapper;	moreover,	knowledge	of	all	 these	 facts	at	best	equips	me	with	knowledge	that	 I	 am	one	 of	 the	 candidates	 but	 fails	 to	 rule	 out	 that	 I	 am	 a	 handless	 overlapper.	However,	if	I	falsely	believe	that	my	right	hand	has	been	chopped	off	I	also	do	not	know	various	 non-indexical	 truths	 about	 which	 candidates	 exist	 and	 what	 their	 parts	 are.	Then	 the	modified	slogan,	which	 is	more	 in	keeping	with	 the	spirit	of	 the	self-making	view,	can	be	stated	as	 follows:	You	are	 the	best	 candidate	 satisfier	of	 those	 ‘I’-thoughts	
entertained	in	your	vicinity	that	are	not	based	on	ignorance	(lack	of	knowledge)	about	the	
relevant	non-indexical	truths.	The	 third	 qualification	 is	 best	 brought	 out	 by	 a	 natural	 but	 mistaken	 complaint	against	the	self-making	view.	The	objection	is	that	the	method	of	identifying	us	with	the	best	 candidate	 referents	 of	 our	 ‘I’-thoughts	 will	 not	 narrow	 down	 the	 number	 of	candidates	to	one,	so	the	self-making	view	does	not	solve	the	Problem	of	Overlappers.	Since	we	have	beliefs	about	our	legs,	arms	and	nose	but	not	about	the	electron	in	the	tip	of	 a	 hair	 that	 is	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 falling	 out,	 there	will	 always	 be	 some	 indeterminacy	about	 the	 reference	 of	 ‘I’.	 In	 response,	 I	 should	 emphasize	 again	 that	 the	 Problem	 of	Overlappers	is	a	puzzle	about	why	we	are	(and	how	we	can	usually	know	that	we	are)	things	with	the	parts	we	intuitively	think	we	have.	The	threat	this	problem	poses	is	not	referential	 indeterminacy	 but	 massive	 and	 determinate	 error.	 Since	 the	 self-making	view	 explains	 why	 we	 do	 not	 commit	 this	 kind	 of	 error,	 it	 solves	 the	 Problem	 of	Overlappers.	That	due	 to	 the	widespread	phenomenon	of	 referential	 indeterminacy	 it	does	 not	 guarantee	 a	 single	 referent	 is	 simply	 beside	 the	 point.10	 Nevertheless,	 the	
                                                10	What	does	 the	self-making	view	say	about	particles	 that	obviously	and	determinately	seem	to	be	my	parts	 but	 of	which	 I	 have	 no	 beliefs	 either	way?	 For	 example,	what	 about	 a	 particular	 electron	 in	 the	middle	 of	my	 body?	 Cases	 like	 this	 do	 not	 pose	 a	 problem	 for	 the	 self-making	 view.	 Take	 a	 particular	electron	e	that	is	clearly	a	part	of	my	right	leg.	While	it	is	true	that	I	have	no	beliefs	about	e,	I	do	believe	that	the	right	leg	is	a	part	of	me.	So	the	best	candidate	referent	of	my	‘I’-thoughts	is	something	that	has	the	right	leg.	But	parthood	is	transitive.	So	this	best	candidate	also	has	e	as	a	part.	The	self-making	view	does	not	imply	that	to	have	some	x	as	a	part	it	is	necessary	to	believe	that	one	has	x	as	a	part.	
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objection	does	show	that	there	may	be	no	such	thing	as	the	best	candidate	satisfier	of	our	‘I’-thoughts.	We	can	take	this	point	and	modify	the	slogan	one	last	time	as	follows:	
You	are	one	of	 the	best	 satisfiers	of	 those	 ‘I’-thoughts	entertained	 in	your	vicinity	which	
are	 not	 based	 on	 ignorance	 about	 the	 relevant	 non-indexical	 truths.	 This	 formulation	allows	for	ties.	But	it	is	an	unlovely	mouthful,	so	in	the	interest	of	readability	I	will	often	leave	 the	qualifications	 implicit	and	refer	 to	 the	self-making	view	as	 the	view	that	we	are	the	best	candidate	referents	of	the	‘I’-thoughts	entertained	in	our	vicinity.11	Hopefully,	by	now	we	have	a	sufficiently	clear	grasp	of	what	the	self-making	view	is.	But	do	we	have	any	reason	to	accept	 it?	 I	 think	we	do.	Though	I	have	no	knock-down	argument	to	offer,	I	would	like	to	mention	a	few	considerations	that	to	my	mind	make	the	 view	 very	 attractive.	 These	 fall	 into	 two	 categories.	 First,	 we	 have	 ‘bottom-up’	considerations:	 the	 self-making	 view	 dovetails	 with	 plausible	 views	 about	demonstrative	 reference	 and	 mental	 content.	 Second,	 there	 are	 ‘top-down’	considerations:	the	self-making	view	has	great	problem-solving	potential.	Let	 us	 start	 with	 the	 ‘bottom-up’	 motivations.	 It	 is	 customary	 to	 distinguish	between	pure	indexicals	(‘I’,	 ‘today’,	 ‘tomorrow’)	and	true	demonstratives	(‘this’,	 ‘that’,	‘she’,	 ‘he’).	 The	 difference	 is,	 roughly,	 that	 while	 the	 reference	 of	 a	 pure	 indexical	 is	secured	‘automatically’	by	its	meaning	and	the	context	(Perry	1997,	pp.	595–6),	 in	the	case	 of	 true	 demonstratives	 some	 extra	 effort	 is	 required	 –	 perhaps	 a	 physical	demonstration	 (Kaplan	 1989a,	 Reimer	 1991)	 or	 certain	 directing	 intentions	 (Kaplan	1989b,	 Bach	 1992,	 Perry	 1997,	 p.	 595).	 An	 interesting	 intermediate	 group	 includes	demonstratives	such	as	 ‘here’	and	 ‘now’.	Arguably,	 these	demonstratives	are	 like	pure	indexicals	 in	 that	 their	 meaning	 and	 context	 put	 automatic	 constraints	 on	 their	reference.	But	they	are	like	true	demonstratives	in	that	these	constraints	leave	standing	more	than	one	candidate	referent.	Typical	uses	of	‘here’	refer	to	the	speaker’s	location,	but	 there	 can	 be	 considerable	 variation	 in	 the	 extent	 of	 this	 location:	 it	 can	 be	 the	speaker’s	immediate	vicinity,	her	room,	her	apartment,	etc.	Mutatis	mutandis	for	‘now’:	in	every	context	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 time	of	 the	utterance,	but	 the	span	of	 that	 time	 is	not	constant.12	 We	 could	 say	 that	 the	 reference	 of	 such	 indexicals	 is	 secured	 ‘quasi-automatically’	and,	following	Recanati	2001,	call	them	impure	indexicals:	their	meaning	and	context	puts	automatic	constraints	on	 their	 reference,	but	 these	constraints	 leave	some	wiggle	room	that	we	do	not	find	in	pure	indexicals.	Whether	the	reference	of	true	demonstratives	depends	on	the	speaker’s	intention	is	a	controversial	issue.	But	it	seems	evident	that	intention	plays	a	role	in	determining	the	reference	 of	 impure	 indexicals	 such	 as	 ‘here’	 and	 ‘now’.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 in	 the	absence	 of	 such	 an	 intention,	 ‘here’	 and	 ‘now’-utterances	 are	 vacuous;	 perhaps	 they	have	an	element	of	indeterminacy	and	still	come	out	true	on	every	precisification,	as	in	
                                                11	Hawthorne	(2006)	briefly	entertains	a	view	somewhat	similar	to	my	self-making	view.	This	view	does	not	 seem	 to	allow	 for	 ties,	 since	Hawthorne	presents	 it	 as	a	proposal	about	how	 to	precisify	 the	vague	predicate	 ‘is	 a	 person’.	 As	 should	 be	 clear	 by	 now,	 I	 think	 that	 the	 Problem	 of	 Overlappers	 should	 be	sharply	distinguished	from	any	problem	having	to	do	with	vagueness.	12	Kaplan	 includes	 ‘here’	 and	 ‘now’	on	his	official	 list	of	pure	 indexicals,	but	as	he	points	out	 they	both	suffer	from	a	certain	amount	of	vagueness	(1989a,	p.	491	f12).	
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‘There	 are	 no	mammoths	 here’.	 I	 am	making	 a	much	weaker	 claim:	 in	 central	 cases,	when	the	speaker	knows	the	relevant	non-indexical	truths,	her	intention	constrains	the	indexical’s	reference	so	as	to	make	her	utterance	true.	Suppose	that	sitting	in	my	chair,	I	look	 to	 the	 right	 and	 see	 my	 cup	 on	 the	 table.	 I	 then	 utter:	 ‘The	 cup	 is	 here’.	 The	reference	of	‘here’	is	quasi-automatic:	it	has	to	include	my	exact	location,	but	it	can	also	include	more.	One	might	then	ask:	what	makes	 it	 the	case	that	 I	 truly	said	of	a	spatial	region	including	my	table	that	my	cup	was	present	in	it,	rather	than	falsely	of	a	smaller	region	not	including	the	table?	Arguably,	the	answer	is	simply	that	to	some	extent	it	is	up	 to	 me	 which	 place	 I	 refer	 to	 when	 I	 say	 ‘here’,	 and	 I	 had	 in	 mind	 a	 region	 that	included	the	table.	There	are	 limits	 to	this;	 for	 instance	I	could	not	mean	your	table	 if	you	lived	thousands	of	miles	away	from	me.	But	within	certain	constraints,	I	can	simply	decide	to	use	‘here’	so	as	to	include	my	table.	Similar	remarks	apply	to	‘here’-	and	‘now’-
thoughts.	If	looking	to	the	right	I	see	that	my	cup	is	on	the	table,	my	thought	that	the	cup	is	 here	 is	 very	 easily	 true—true	 simply	 because	 I	 know	 the	 relevant	 non-indexical	truths,	and	the	table	is	within	the	range	of	locations	I	can	think	of	as	‘here’.13	Now,	 ‘I’	 is	 almost	 invariably	 treated	 as	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 group	 of	 pure	indexicals	as	‘today’	and	‘tomorrow’.	However,	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	should	make	us	 realize	 that	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 closer	 to	 ‘here’	 and	 ‘now’.	 In	 every	 context,	 several	overlapping	 locations	 are	 intrinsically	 eligible	 to	 be	 picked	 out	 by	 ‘here’.	 Likewise,	 in	every	context	several	person-candidates	are	intrinsically	eligible	to	be	picked	out	by	‘I’.	This	may	be	puzzling,	but	luckily	a	solution	naturally	recommends	itself.	Above	I	have	suggested	 that	 our	 ‘here’-thoughts	 and	 utterances	 are	 usually	 true	 because	 we	 have	some	 freedom	about	which	place	we	pick	out	with	 them.	The	 truth	of	most	of	our	 ‘I’-thoughts	can	be	explained	in	a	similar	way.	I	know	that	there	is	at	least	one	entity	here	that	has	 four	 limbs,	 and	 this	entity	 is	 intrinsically	eligible	 to	be	 the	 referent	of	my	 ‘I’-thought.	So	my	belief	that	I	have	four	limbs	is	easily	true—just	as	easily	as	my	belief	that	the	cup	is	here.	To	be	sure,	as	a	matter	of	 fact	 ‘I’	shows	more	stability	 in	 its	reference	than	 ‘here’:	 with	 a	 few	 exceptions	 (which	 I	 will	 discuss	 in	 section	 4),	 most	 of	 us	consistently	use	‘I’	to	refer	to	a	humanoid.	But	I	maintain	that	this	difference	is	only	one	of	degree.	If	that	is	right,	we	get	the	following	argument	for	the	self-making	view.	That	our	 intentions	 have	 a	 role	 in	 reference	 determination	 (or	 at	 least	 reference	constraining)	 is	 highly	 plausible	 for	 impure	 indexicals	 such	 as	 ‘here’	 and	 ‘now’;	 the	Problem	of	Overlappers	gives	us	reason	to	think	that	‘I’,	too,	is	an	impure	indexical;	and	so	 it	 is	 natural	 to	 accept	 that	 our	 intentions	 play	 a	 similar	 role	 in	 constraining	 the	reference	of	our	‘I’-thoughts.	But	to	accept	this	is	to	accept	the	self-making	view.	To	my	mind,	the	aforementioned	analogy	with	‘here’	is	already	quite	suggestive.	But	the	self-making	view	also	dovetails	nicely	with	a	plausible	big-picture	theory	of	mental	content,	advocated	in	a	series	of	papers	by	David	Lewis.14	Lewis’s	core	question	is	how	
                                                13	Recanati	(2001)	presents	essentially	this	view	about	‘here’	and	‘now’	as	more	or	less	the	standard	view	in	the	literature.	Like	most	philosophers	of	language	writing	on	indexicals,	Recanati	focuses	on	utterances	involving	‘here’	and	‘now’	and	is	less	concerned	with	‘here’-	and	‘now’-thoughts.	14	See	Lewis	1974,	1979,	1983,	1994.	I	follow	Weatherson	2013	and	Schwarz	2014	in	assigning	a	rather	limited	role	to	naturalness	in	Lewis’s	theory	of	content.	But	even	if	I	turned	out	to	be	wrong,	this	would	
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the	objective	facts	determine	mental	content,	and	his	starting	point	is	the	platitude	that	mental	 states	 are	 caused	 by	 experiential	 input	 and	 cause	 behaviour.	 This	 raises	 a	version	of	the	problem	of	radical	interpretation:	a	mental	state’s	experiential	input	and	behavioural	output	still	underdetermine	its	content.	Lewis	thinks	that	to	overcome	this	problem	we	need	to	appeal	 to	certain	basic	principles	of	 folk	psychology,	 ‘our	general	theory	 of	 persons’	 (1974,	 p.	 334).	 One	 such	 principle	 is	 that	 a	 subject’s	 attitudes	generally	rationalize	her	behaviour;	other	things	equal	a	subject’s	beliefs	are	sensitive	to	her	evidence	and	apt	 to	 cause	behaviour	 that	 fits	her	goals.	On	Lewis’s	view,	 these	general	 constraints	 are	 constitutive	 of	 mental	 content:	 we	 cannot	 believe	 or	 desire	things	that	are	too	unfit	to	be	believed	or	desired.	Lewis	 never	 discusses	 the	 Problem	 of	 Overlappers15,	 but	 his	 theory	 of	 content	suggests	a	plausible	way	 to	attack	 it.	Consider	a	 set	of	overlapping	person-candidates	whose	 behaviour	 and	 speech	 acts	 indicate	 that	 they	 believe	 of	 something	 in	 their	vicinity	that	it	has	human	form.	Our	task	is	to	determine	the	content	of	these	beliefs.	The	epistemological	upshot	of	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	was	that	the	candidates	did	not	differ	with	respect	 to	their	evidence.	 In	that	case,	 it	would	be	 in	Lewis’s	spirit	 to	start	with	 the	 ‘I’-predications,	 leave	 open	 their	 subject,	 and	 ask	 which	 referent	 the	 ‘I’-thoughts	are	fit	to	be	believed	about.	The	mere	fact	that	the	candidates	have	the	same	evidence	 does	 not	 prevent	 them	 from	 knowing	 certain	 truisms,	 for	 example	 that	 no	limb-complement	has	 four	 limbs.	This	helps	determine	what	 is	and	what	 is	not	 fit	 for	them	to	believe.	If	they	say,	‘I	have	two	hands	and	two	legs’,	we	can	take	them	to	express	a	 belief	 about	 a	 humanoid.	 If	 instead	 we	 took	 them	 to	 express	 a	 belief	 about	 a	 leg-complement,	 we	 would	 violate	 a	 principle	 of	 constitutive	 rationality:	 since	 the	 leg-complement	obviously	does	not	have	four	limbs,	we	would	thereby	assign	to	a	person	content	 that	 clearly	 does	 not	 fit	 her	 evidence.	 I	 do	 not	 want	 to	 suggest	 that	 Lewis	himself	would	accept	 this	 reasoning.	But	 the	self-making	view	strikes	me	as	a	natural	application	of	the	general	Lewisian	idea	that	constitutive	rationality	plays	a	role	in	the	determination	of	content.	We	can	now	turn	to	 ‘top-down’	considerations	in	support	of	the	self-making	view.	As	 I	 already	argued,	 the	view	provides	a	nice	 solution	 to	 the	Problem	of	Overlappers.	But	 in	doing	so,	 it	also	displays	a	 further	virtue:	 it	 is	structurally	similar	to	an	elegant	solution	 to	 the	 Problem	 of	 Almost-Persons.	 Taking	 this	 solution	 on	 board,	 we	 get	 a	unified	 treatment	 of	 two	 closely	 related	 puzzles	 in	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 persons.	According	to	Noonan’s	PPR,	 the	 first-person	pronoun	can	only	refer	 to	persons.	When	an	 overlapper	 uses	 the	word	 ‘I’	 it	 does	 not	 refer	 to	 itself	 but	 to	whichever	 person	 it	overlaps.16	I	find	this	proposal	attractive.	Note,	however,	that	it	only	solves	the	Problem	
                                                                                                                                                  not	matter	 to	 the	present	discussion,	 since	 the	various	overlapping	person-candidates	plausibly	do	not	differ	 in	 their	naturalness	enough	 for	 this	 to	be	 the	 tip	of	 the	scale	(see	Sider	2001a	 for	a	similar	point	about	identity	over	time).	For	a	related	line	of	thought	along	Davidsonian	interpretationist	lines	and	with	quite	different	results,	see	Madden	2011b.	15	He	does	discuss	the	Problem	of	the	Many	(Lewis	1993),	which,	recall,	is	a	very	different	problem.	16	See	Noonan	1998,	2001,	and	2010.	Note	that	Noonan	himself	employed	the	idea	to	solve	the	Problem	of	the	Thinking	Animal,	while	I	am	applying	it	to	persons	and	their	overlappers.	
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of	Almost-Persons;	it	leaves	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	completely	untouched	(not	that	Noonan	suggests	otherwise).	For	instance,	it	implies	that	when	I	say	or	think	‘I’	I	refer	to	a	 person,	 but	 it	 does	not	 ensure	 that	 this	 person	 is	 not	 a	 nose-complement.	 The	 self-making	view	solves	this	problem:	I	am	a	humanoid	and	not	a	nose-complement	because	when	I	think	or	say	‘I’,	I	refer	to	the	best	candidate	referent	of	my	‘I’-thoughts,	and	the	best	 candidate	 is	 a	 humanoid	 and	 not	 a	 nose-complement.	 	 So	 there	 is	 nothing	metaphysically	 special	 about	 the	 entity	 that	 has	 my	 boundaries	 (which	 are	 the	boundaries	of	a	humanoid)	as	opposed	to	the	boundaries	of	my	nose-complement.	The	only	sense	in	which	the	humanoid	is	special	is	that	it	happens	to	be	the	best	candidate	referent	of	my	‘I’-thoughts.	The	self-making	view	also	gives	a	non-mysterious	explanation	of	how	we	can	know	that	we	have	the	boundaries	we	have.	Not	because	despite	our	great	physical	similarity	there	is	a	deep	metaphysical	difference	between	us	and	our	overlappers	that	somehow	prevents	the	latter	from	even	being	candidate	‘I’-referents.	Also	not	because	we	possess	extraordinary	epistemic	powers	that	help	us	make	extremely	 fine-grained	distinctions	among	 several	 overlapping	 objects,	 some	 of	 which	 differ	 from	 us	 only	 in	 negligible	respects.	Nor	by	relying	on	some	very	strong	form	of	externalism	that	 in	effect	denies	that	 the	 Probem	 of	 Overlappers	 poses	 any	 epistemological	 challenge.17	 Rather,	 our	overlappers	are	metaphysically	on	a	par	with	us,	our	capacities	are	fairly	ordinary,	and	so	is	the	world	we	inhabit	with	respect	to	its	epistemic	friendliness.	Yet	these	ordinary	capacities	 and	 circumstances	 are	 just	 good	 enough.	 All	 we	 need	 is	 to	 be	 able	 to	distinguish	between	 the	 candidates	 and	our	 surroundings.	 If	 the	world	 contributes	 in	the	 not	 overly	 demanding	 sense	 of	 containing	 enough	 candidates	 to	 make	 our	 ‘I’-thoughts	true,	we	do	not	have	to	be	metaphysically	distinguished,	extraordinarily	lucky	or	particularly	sophisticated	to	know	that	we	are	what	we	typically	think	we	are.	Clearly,	 Noonan’s	 PPR	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	my	 account.	 One	 reason	 is	 the	aforementioned	structural	similarity:	in	each	case,	the	strategy	is	to	say	that	I	cannot	be	the	wrong	sort	of	thing	because	when	that	thing	says	or	thinks	‘I’,	it	refers	to	me	rather	than	itself.	But	there	is	also	a	second,	equally	important	reason.	In	conjunction	with	the	earlier	 mentioned	 Remainder	 Principle	 (section	 2),	 my	 view	 has	 the	 surprising	consequence	 that	 some	of	 us	are	 hand-,	 arm-	 and	 leg-complements.	 Those	who	 think	that	persons	cannot	be	proper	parts	of	humanoids	may	then	object	that	the	self-making	view	 implies	 that	 some	 ‘I’-referents	 are	 not	 persons,	 thereby	 violating	 the	 Person	Constraint.	We	can	 stave	off	 this	worry	by	 combining	 the	 self-making	view	with	PPR:	since	 ‘I’	always	refers	to	a	person,	 ‘I’-referents	that	are	proper	parts	of	humanoids	are	indeed	 persons.	 So	 the	 self-making	 view	 is	 perfectly	 compatible	 with	 the	 Person	Constraint;	what	has	to	be	rejected	is	the	assumption	that	persons	always	have	human	form.	I	turn	to	these	issues	in	the	next	section.		
                                                17	 Madden	 (forthcoming)	 presents	 and	 dismisses	 such	 a	 response.	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 if	 I	 were	 a	 hand-complement	I	would	not	possess	the	same	evidence	that	I	in	fact	possess	for	having	a	hand,	since	it	would	not	even	be	true	that	I	have	a	hand.	I	side	with	Madden	in	finding	this	answer	unsatisfactory.	
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4.	Self-making	and	Body	Integrity	Identity	Disorder	The	self-making	view	itself	might	sound	strange	at	first	glance,	but	as	we	have	seen,	in	most	 cases	 it	 delivers	 intuitive	 results.	Things	 are	 a	bit	 different	 for	people	who	hold	unusual	 beliefs	 about	 their	 parts.	 Take,	 for	 example,	 Body	 Integrity	 Identity	Disorder	(BIID),	 a	 rare	 psychological	 condition	 often	 categorized	 as	 a	 mental	 illness.	 Patients	suffering	 from	 this	 condition	believe	 that	 at	 least	 one	 of	 their	 healthy	 limbs	does	 not	belong	 to	 them	 and	 that	 they	 could	 live	 a	 happier	 life	without	 that	 limb.18	 (This	 is	 a	controversial	 description;	 some	 would	 say	 that	 most	 BIID	 patients	 accept	 that	 as	 a	matter	of	fact	they	have	the	unwanted	limb	and	only	believe	that	they	should	not	have	it.19	Never	mind:	what	is	essential	to	the	point	of	this	section	is	the	belief	that	one	does	not	 have	 a	 body	 part	 that	 one	 appears	 to	 have.	 If	 you	 think	 BIID	 is	 not	 a	 genuine	example	of	that,	replace	every	future	occurrence	of	‘BIID’	with	‘the	belief	that	one	does	not	have	a	certain	body	part’.20)	In	the	bioethics	literature,	there	is	a	heated	debate	about	the	moral	permissibility	of	elective	amputation.21	The	details	of	this	debate	should	not	concern	us	here;	I	just	want	to	draw	attention	to	the	widely	shared	assumption	that	when	BIID	patients	believe	that	their	unwanted	 limbs	do	not	belong	 to	 them,	 they	are	 irrational	 and	 strictly	 speaking	wrong.	 The	 two	 claims	 are	 not	 independent	 from	 each	 other:	 the	 assumption	 is	 that	BIID	 patients	 are	 obviously	 wrong	 about	 their	 body	 parts	 and,	 since	 their	 mistake	cannot	plausibly	be	explained	as	epistemically	blameless,	they	are	irrational	too.	Why?	The	bioethics	literature	does	not	go	into	that,	but	presumably	the	answer	is	roughly	that	the	patients	do	not	respond	appropriately	to	their	evidence:	they	have	perceptual	and	proprioceptive	 evidence	 that	 they	 have	 certain	 limbs	 (they	 neither	 hallucinate	 nor	experience	 lack	of	control),	yet	 they	deny	that	 they	have	 the	 limb	 in	question.	Now	of	course	the	irrationality	hypothesis	does	not	by	itself	settle	the	dispute,	for	perhaps	we	have	good	moral	reasons	to	respect	some	irrational	and	false	beliefs.	But	the	hypothesis	nicely	 explains	why	 the	 issue	 is	 so	 controversial:	 it	 would	 be	much	more	 difficult	 to	show	 that	 there	 is	 even	 a	prima	 facie	moral	 problem	with	 elective	 amputation	 if	 the	patients’	beliefs	were	neither	false	nor	irrational.	However,	if	the	limb-complements	in	question	exist,	the	self-making	view	appears	to	block	the	implicit	reasoning	behind	the	irrationality	hypothesis.	When	some	‘I’-thoughts	are	entertained	 in	 the	vicinity	of	a	 set	of	overlapping	person-candidates,	 they	refer	 to	their	best	candidate	referent.	If	that	is	right,	a	case	can	be	made	that	BIID	patients	are	neither	irrational	nor	mistaken	about	their	parts.	Take	a	host	of	overlapping	candidates	
                                                18	Here	and	in	what	follows,	I	assume	that	some	x	belongs	to	S	iff	S	has	x	as	a	part.	19	Bayne	and	Levy	(2005)	cite	a	survey,	according	to	which	only	13%	of	BIIDs	reported	that	the	unwanted	limb	was	not	their	own.	20	 I	 am	 also	 assuming	 that	 BIID	 patients’	 de	 se	 beliefs	 are	 consistent.	 For	 instance	 if	 a	 BIID	 patient	 is	attached	to	a	left	leg	with	a	birthmark	on	it,	he	does	not	believe	both	that	he	does	not	have	the	left	leg	and	that	he	has	the	birthmark.	When	such	inconsistencies	arise,	the	best	candidate	referent	has	to	be	settled	on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis:	 which	 belief	 is	 more	 central	 in	 the	 patient’s	 belief	 system?	 For	 the	 sake	 of	simplicity,	here	I	stick	to	clear	cases	in	which	the	patient’s	beliefs	about	his	parts	are	fully	consistent.	21	See	Bayne	&	Levy	2005,	Levy	2009,	and	J.	Kovacs	2009	in	defence	of	and	Müller	2009	against	elective	amputation.	
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5.1.	Self-reference	and	‘I’-thoughts	PPR	 plays	 double	 duty	 in	my	 account.	 For	 one,	 it	 ensures	 that	 the	 view	 respects	 the	Person	 Constraint.	 For	 another,	 it	 helps	 give	 a	 unified	 solution	 to	 the	 Problem	 of	Overlappers	 and	 the	 Problem	 of	 Almost-Persons.	 In	 this	 sub-section	 I	 address	 two	objections	to	the	claim	that	when	using	the	personal	pronoun	 ‘I’	only	persons	refer	to	themselves,	while	 their	overlappers	refer	 to	 the	persons	 they	overlap.	The	 first	one	 is	that	this	claim	is	simply	false.	The	second	is	that	even	if	true,	it	is	of	no	help	in	solving	the	Problem	of	Overlappers.	Let	me	start	with	the	first	worry.	Madden	maintains	that			[T]here	 is	 no	 evident	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 our	 use	 of	 the	 first-person	 pronoun	 is	 governed	 by	 a	convention	of	referring	to	any	particular	kind	of	object.	It	is	improbable	that	the	standing	meaning	of	a	 word	 such	 as	 ‘I’	 embodies	 any	 restriction	 on	 the	 kind	 of	 thing	 to	which	 it	may	 refer.	 (Madden	forthcoming,	§2.2)		Now,	 it	 is	clear	 from	the	context	 that	by	 ‘kind’	Madden	means	something	with	certain	persistence	conditions	(see	also	2011a,	p.	345),	and	I	agree	with	him	that	the	semantics	of	 ‘I’	has	no	built-in	restriction	on	 the	persistence	conditions	of	 its	 referent.	However,	PPR	 imposes	no	 such	 restriction;	 all	 it	 requires	 is	 that	whatever	 ‘I’	 refers	 to	also	 falls	under	 the	predicate	 ‘is	 a	person’,	whether	 the	property	of	being	a	person	determines	persistence	conditions	or	not.	This	weaker	thesis	retains	Noonan’s	core	insight	that	it	is	something	 like	 a	 conceptual	 truth	 that	 the	 first-person	 pronoun	 can	 only	 refer	 to	persons.	And	I	maintain	that	pace	Madden	this	view	is	plausible,	once	stripped	off	 the	essentialist	connotations.	Elsewhere,	Madden	(2011a)	argues	against	PPR	in	a	slightly	different	way.	The	gist	of	his	objection	is	this.	The	best	non-circular	explanation	of	the	intention	to	self-refer	is	that	 the	 intention’s	 content	 is	 a	 repeatable	 act	 of	 the	 form	 x	 refers	 to	 x.	 But	 since	 an	overlapper	 (or	 in	 Madden’s	 discussion,	 an	 animal)	 is	 able	 to	 entertain	 the	 thought	 x	
refers	to	x,	it	is	also	able	to	self-refer.	In	response,	we	can	grant	the	general	rule	that	self-reference	involves	grasping	the	thought	x	refers	to	x	but	maintain	that	a	successful	self-referential	use	of	 ‘I’	also	requires	that	one	be	a	person.	Madden	asks	what,	given	their	grasp	 of	 what	 it	 is	 for	 an	 x	 to	 refer	 to	 x,	 could	 possibly	 prevent	 non-persons	 from	referring	 to	 themselves.	 The	 answer	 is:	 nothing.	 The	 claim	 has	 never	 been	 that	 the	overlappers	are	unable	to	refer	to	themselves.	The	claim	is	merely	that	they	cannot	have	self-referential	‘I’-thoughts.22	Let	me	now	turn	to	the	second	concern:	even	if	PPR	is	correct,	there	is	an	aspect	of	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	 that	 neither	 it	 nor	my	 self-making	 view	 can	 solve	 (Olson	1997b,	 2002,	 Madden	 forthcoming).	 The	 problem	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 that	 even	 if	 my	overlappers	cannot	use	the	word	 ‘I’	to	refer	to	themselves,	 it	does	not	follow	that	they	cannot	 think	 of	 themselves	 in	 the	 first-person	mode.	Perhaps	when	 I	 open	my	mouth	
                                                22	Noonan	(2001,	p.	328)	makes	a	similar	point.	
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and	 say,	 ‘I	 have	 two	hands’,	 the	 semantics	 of	 ‘I’	 ensures	 that	my	handless	 overlapper	also	 says	 something	 true.	 But	 the	 overlapper	 is	 not	 thereby	 prevented	 from	 falsely	believing	that	it	has	a	hand,	even	if	it	cannot	give	linguistic	expression	to	this	belief.	And	so	I	still	do	not	know	that	I	am	not	a	handless	overlapper.	While	Noonan	usually	formulates	PPR	as	a	view	about	the	linguistic	expression	‘I’,	I	have	all	along	been	 talking	both	about	 first-person	 language	and	 first-person	 thought.	There	is	one	place	where	Noonan	indicates	that	his	account	is	also	intended	to	apply	to	‘I’-thoughts:	‘there	is	no	ignorance	of	the	kind	Olson	describes’,	he	writes,	‘because	there	is	no	expressible	thought	whose	truth-value	is	unknowable	in	the	way	he	thinks’	(2001,	p.	 328).	 I	 want	 to	 give	 essentially	 the	 same	 answer.	 When	 I	 think	 the	 thought	expressible	by	the	sentence	‘I	have	a	nose’,	there	is	only	one	thought	entertained	here.	Of	 course,	 my	 overlappers	 can	 and	 do	 have	 ‘I’-thoughts,	 but	 these	 are	 numerically	identical	 to	my	 ‘I’-thoughts.	 And	 since	 my	 ‘I’-thoughts	 refer	 to	 their	 best	 candidate	referent,	there	is	no	room	left	for	my	overlappers’	‘I’-thoughts	to	refer	to	anything	else—otherwise	they	would	not	be	numerically	identical	to	my	‘I’-thoughts	(they	would	have	different	content—see	sub-section	5.3).	This	last	claim	might	be	exactly	what	Olson	and	Madden	tacitly	reject:	perhaps	they	think	that	my	overlappers’	thoughts	are	qualitatively	indistinguishable	but	numerically	distinct	from	mine.	Motivated	by	this	intuition,	they	could	try	to	distinguish	the	Problem	of	 Overlappers	 from	 the	 Problem	 of	 Overlapping	 Thoughts:	 which	 of	 the	 many	qualitatively	indistinguishable	sets	of	thoughts	is	mine,	and	how	can	I	know	which	one	is	 mine?	 I	 agree	 that	 neither	 PPR	 nor	 my	 self-making	 view	 solves	 this	 problem.	However,	I	also	think	that	there	is	no	such	problem	to	begin	with.	The	reasoning	that	led	to	 the	Problem	of	Overlappers	 simply	does	not	generate	anything	 like	 the	Problem	of	Overlapping	Thoughts.23	One	 might	 try	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 Problem	 of	 Overlapping	 Thoughts	 is	 easily	generated	 once	 we	 accept	 a	 Fregean	 conception	 of	 ‘I’-thoughts.	 On	 the	 Fregean	conception,	 ‘I’-thoughts	 are	 constituted	by	private	 and	unshareable	 senses,	 so	no	 two	subjects	can	share	numerically	the	same	‘I’-thought.	Following	Morgan	(2009),	call	this	the	 Unshareability	 Claim	 (UC).	 The	 usual	 motivation	 for	 UC	 lies	 in	 a	 functionalist	account	 of	 first-person	 thought.	 Functionalist	 views	 characterize	 the	 essence	 of	 ‘I’-thoughts	 in	terms	of	the	perceptual/proprioceptive	 input	that	generates	them	and	the	behavioural	output	 they	produce.24	Morgan,	 for	example,	argues	that	any	 functionalist	account	has	 to	accept	at	 least	one	of	 the	 following	claims:	 (i)	only	my	 ‘I’-thoughts	are	sensitive	in	a	direct	way	to	gaining	perceptual	information	from	this	particular	point	of	view;	 (ii)	 only	my	 ‘I’-thoughts	 are	 sensitive	 to	 proprioceptive	 information	 gained	 via	this	 particular	 body;	 and	 (iii)	 only	my	 ‘I’-thoughts	 directly	 produce	 behaviour	 in	 this	body.	As	a	result,	any	functionalist	account	of	first-person	thought	entails	UC	(2009,	pp.	73–4).	
                                                23	For	a	similar	distinction,	see	McMahan	2002,	p.	105	and	Zimmerman	2003a,	p.	508.	McMahan	takes	it	to	be	obvious	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	the	Problem	of	Overlapping	Thoughts.	24	See	Evans	1981	for	a	classic	defence	of	the	Fregean-functionalist	view.	
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Of	course,	 functionalism	about	 ‘I’-thoughts	is	a	controversial	thesis.	But	we	do	not	need	to	take	a	stance	on	it	to	see	that	we	cannot	rely	on	any	of	(i)-(iii)	to	support	UC,	since	 in	 light	 of	 the	 Problem	 of	 Overlappers	 we	 have	 reason	 to	 reject	 each	 of	 these	principles.	 Principles	 (i)	 and	 (ii)	 are	 obviously	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 distinct	subjects	 never	 gain	 the	 same	 perceptual	 and	 proprioceptive	 input	 through	 the	 same	body.	But	I	and	my	overlappers	do	have	the	same	input:	we	share	a	point	of	view	from	which	 everything	 looks	 and	 feels	 the	 same.	 Similar	 remarks	 apply	 to	principle	 (iii).	 It	may	 be	 true	 that	 two	 disjoint	 subjects’	 behaviour	 is	 never	 produced	 by	 the	 same	thoughts.	 But	 my	 thoughts	 do	 produce	 behaviour	 in	 my	 overlappers,	 and	 my	overlappers’	 thoughts	 also	 produce	 behaviour	 in	me.	 It	 seems,	 then,	 that	 people	 and	their	 overlappers	 pose	 a	 counterexample	 to	 each	 of	 (i)-(iii).	 The	 somewhat	 ironical	upshot	is	that	UC,	the	extra	premiss	needed	to	get	from	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	to	the	 Problem	 of	 Overlapping	 Thoughts,	 is	 undermined	 by	 the	 Problem	 of	 Overlappers	itself.	These	brief	remarks	are	not	intended	to	refute	the	spirit	of	functionalism	about	‘I’-thoughts.	My	point	is	merely	that	the	Problem	of	Overlappers	gives	us	ample	reason	to	reject	UC	as	formulated	above,	and	weaker	formulations	will	not	generate	the	Problem	of	 Overlapping	 Thoughts.	 So	 we	 have	 been	 given	 no	 reason	 for	 thinking	 that	 our	overlappers	may	have	false	but	inexpressible	beliefs	about	themselves.	The	objections	discussed	so	far	were	directed	to	an	aspect	of	my	view	that	it	shares	with	Noonan’s.	 In	 the	remainder	of	 this	section,	 I	will	address	potential	complications	that	are	specific	to	the	self-making	view.	
	
5.2.	The	limits	of	self-making	I	am	the	best	candidate	referent	of	the	‘I’-thoughts	entertained	in	my	vicinity.	But	when	is	 something	 a	 candidate	 referent	 of	 my	 ‘I’-thoughts?	 Some	 cases	 seem	 obvious.	 My	undetached	headless	torso,	for	instance,	does	not	have	my	thinking	parts	and	so	cannot	think	 my	 ‘I’-thoughts.	 Neither	 can	 subjects	 disjoint	 from	 me:	 though	 they	 can	 have	thoughts,	they	lack	my	thinking	parts,	which	they	would	need	in	order	to	have	these	‘I’-thoughts.	Generally,	we	can	accept	the	following	constraint	on	what	can	be	a	candidate	referent	of	a	set	of	‘I’-thoughts:		 (Thinking	 Parts	 Constraint)	 If	 S	 is	 a	 candidate	 referent	 of	 the	 ‘I’-thoughts	entertained	in	S’s	vicinity,	then	S*	is	a	candidate	referent	of	those	‘I’-thoughts	only	 if	 it	shares	those	of	S’s	parts	 that	are	minimally	sufficient	 for	having	 ‘I’-thoughts.		The	Thinking	Parts	Constraint	does	not	provide	a	non-circular	definition	of	candidacy.	Indeed,	I	doubt	such	a	definition	is	possible.25	The	idea	is	that	we	all	have	a	clear	grasp	of	 paradigm	 cases,	 which	 we	 can	 then	 use	 to	 circumscribe	 the	 less	 obvious	 ones.	 A	
                                                25	That	would	presumably	require	a	descriptivist	view	of	‘I’,	which	is	widely	thought	to	be	untenable	due	to	arguments	by	Perry	(1979)	and	others.	
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whole	 human	 organism	 is	 undoubtedly	 a	 candidate	 referent	 of	 the	 ‘I’-thoughts	entertained	in	its	vicinity	even	if	(as	in	the	case	of	BIID	patients)	it	ultimately	fails	to	be	a	referent	of	 those	 thoughts.	The	constraint	also	shows	why	we	are	not	committed	 to	certain	implausible	cases	of	self-making:	lacking	thinking	parts,	head-complements	and	corpses	are	not	even	candidate	‘I’-referents.	The	self-making	view	clearly	has	its	limits:	we	should	identify	BIID	patients	with	limb-complements,	but	as	these	examples	show,	not	just	anything	goes.26	Another	interesting	question	that	is	not	settled	by	the	Thinking	Parts	Constraint	is	whether	persons	can	have	humanoids	as	proper	parts	(rather	than	being	embedded	in	them).	Can	a	person,	for	instance,	use	‘I’	to	refer	to	the	mereological	sum	of	a	humanoid	and	an	artificial	organ	or	prosthetic	limb?	Of	course,	for	this	question	to	even	arise	the	mereological	sum	in	question	has	to	exist.	And	for	that,	we	have	to	make	assumptions	stronger	 than	 the	 ones	 needed	 to	 generate	 the	Problem	of	Overlappers,	 and	 stronger	even	 than	 those	 needed	 to	 derive	 the	 surprising	 consequences	 for	 BIID	 patients.	We	have	 to	 assume	 not	 just	 the	 existence	 of	 undetached	 thinking	 parts	 but	 also	 a	 very	liberal	theory	of	composition,	presumably	universalism	(the	view	that	any	arbitrary	xs	in	any	arrangement	have	a	mereological	 sum).	But	on	 the	assumption	 that	 such	part-humanoid	 sums	 do	 exist,	 I	 remain	 open	 to	 the	 possibility	 that	 some	 of	 them	 are	 ‘I’-referents	and	therefore	persons.27	In	that	case,	we	can	take	some	people	to	literally	have	their	artificial	organs	or	prosthetic	limbs	as	parts	if	they	think	they	have	them.28	I	will	not	argue	for	this	view	here.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	the	Thinking	Parts	Constraint	does	not	rule	it	out,	and	I	consider	this	a	good	thing.	Can	 we	 say	 anything	 more	 general?	 Is,	 for	 example,	 the	 whole	 world	 or	 the	mereological	 sum	of	 two	 conscious	beings	 a	 candidate	 for	being	me?	 If	 not,	why	not?	Instead	of	offering	a	fully	general	answer,	I	wish	to	point	out	that	several	independently	plausible	intrinsic	constraints	on	persons	deny	candidacy	from	such	things,	and	nothing	in	 the	self-making	view	 forces	us	 to	give	up	 these	constraints.	For	example,	we	might	want	 to	 require	 that	 any	 person	 satisfy	 certain	minimal	 requirements	 of	 physical	 or	psychological	unity	so	that	the	mereological	sum	of	two	physically	disconnected	things	or	two	distinct	loci	of	consciousness	is	never	even	a	person-candidate.	More	generally,	
                                                26	Motivated	by	familiar	externalist	“slow	switching”	scenarios,	Madden	has	recently	defended	a	kind	of	“best-candidate”	theory	of	self-reference	according	to	which	it	is	sometimes	possible	for	a	dead	organism	to	be	 the	 true	 referent	 ‘I’	 if	 it	 is	 the	best	knowledge-maximizing	assignment	 to	 ‘I’	 (2011b,	pp.	309–15).	Despite	some	similarities,	my	view	is	importantly	different	from	Madden’s.	First,	Madden	presupposes	an	animalist	theory	of	personal	identity	and,	as	we	have	seen,	rejects	the	Person	Constraint.	Second,	the	self-making	 view	 is	 chiefly	 concerned	with	 self-reference	at	 a	 time	 and	 our	 knowledge	 thereof	 in	 ordinary	cases,	while	Madden’s	main	 interest	 lies	 in	 identity	over	 time,	especially	 in	certain	extraordinary	cases.	My	preferred	approach	to	identity	over	time	is	also	quite	different	from	Madden’s,	but	one	I	lack	space	to	get	into	here.	27	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	personhood	of	such	things	is	perfectly	compatible	with	Williams’s	part-intrinsicality	 thesis,	 according	 to	 which	 any	 nomically	 possible	 duplicate	 of	 a	 person	 is	 a	 proper	 or	improper	part	of	a	person	(2013,	p.	442).	28	 It	 is	 difficult	 not	 to	 notice	 that	 this	 line	 of	 thought	 is	 a	 natural	 extension	 of	 the	 extended	 mind	hypothesis,	famously	proposed	by	Clark	and	Chalmers	(1998).	
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the	self-making	view	is	compatible	with	many	different	takes	on	what	sorts	of	things	we	are:	 essentially	psychological,	 phenomenal	or	biological	beings,	 or	what	have	you.	My	own	 view	 is	 that	we	 cannot	 say	 anything	 general	 about	what	 kinds	 of	 things	we	 are	other	than	that	we	are	material	objects.	But	this	 is	not	mandatory.	All	 the	self-making	view	officially	requires	 is	 that	whatever	 intrinsic	conditions	something	has	 to	meet	 to	be	a	referent	of	a	token	of	 ‘I’,	several	objects	satisfy	that	condition.29	This	is	where	my	view	 can	 be	 the	 tip	 of	 the	 scale:	 of	 the	 several	 candidates	 in	 our	 vicinity	 that	 are	intrinsically	eligible	to	be	the	referents	of	our	‘I’-thoughts,	we	are	the	best	satisfiers	of	these	thoughts.		
5.3.	Concerns	about	conventions	The	self-making	view	is	a	view	not	just	about	first-person	language	but	also	about	first-person	 thought.	One	might	nevertheless	worry	 that	 it	 is	not	 really	 a	 revisionary	view	about	self-reference.	Perhaps	people	are	 free	to	use	the	word	 ‘I’	 to	refer	to	their	 limb-complements,	 but	 in	 that	 case	 they	 just	 use	 the	 word	with	 a	 non-standard	meaning,	since	 the	 linguistic	 conventions	 rule	 against	 people	 being	 limb-complements.	 The	objector	 could	 grant	 even	 that	 BIID	 patients	 can	 think	 of	 their	 limb-complements	 in	some	 broadly	 first-personal	 way,	 while	 maintaining	 that	 they	 do	 not	 have	 true	 ‘I’-thoughts	 about	 their	 limb-complements	 in	 the	 same	 sense	 most	 of	 us	 have	 true	 ‘I’-thoughts	about	ourselves.	To	address	this	objection,	we	should	begin	by	asking	what	it	would	mean	for	BIID	patients	and	the	rest	of	us	to	mean	different	things	by	‘I’.	It	is	customary	in	the	literature	on	indexicals	to	distinguish	between	two	kinds	of	meaning:	if	you	say	‘I	am	hungry’	and	I	 say	 ‘I	 am	hungry’,	 there	 is	 intuitively	 a	 sense	 in	which	we	 say	 the	 same	 thing	and	a	sense	in	which	we	say	different	things.	Following	Kaplan	(1989a),	I	will	refer	to	these	as	
character	 and	content,	 respectively,	 though	 there	are	many	other	ways	 to	 capture	 the	distinction.30	Character	 is	the	kind	of	meaning	that	 is	constant	across	different	uses	of	the	same	indexical,	while	content	is	the	one	that	varies	with	the	speaker.	So	when	you	and	I	use	the	word	‘I’	we	use	it	with	the	same	character	but	with	different	contents.	This	narrows	down	our	question	to	whether	BIID	patients	use	the	word	 ‘I’	with	a	different	
character	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 us	 (that	 they	use	 it	with	 a	different	 content	 is	 obvious	 and	simply	respected	by	the	self-making	view).	On	a	standard	view,	the	character	of	‘I’	is	captured	by	the	rule	that	every	token	of	‘I’	refers	to	the	speaker	who	produces	that	token.	The	Problem	of	Overlappers	forces	us	to	realize	that	there	is	an	obvious	problem	with	this	simple	rule:	there	are	many	speakers	
                                                29	 Note	 that	 certain	 popular	 restrictions,	 for	 example	 that	 persons	 like	 us	 are	 human	 animals,	 do	 not	specify	intrinsic	conditions.	Being	a	human	animal	is	a	maximal	property,	partly	a	matter	of	not	being	part	of	 another	human	animal.	However,	 the	 self-making	view	 is	 still	 compatible	with	 a	 close	 cousin	of	 this	view:	human	persons	are	intrinsically	qualified	to	be	human	animals.	30	The	distinction	is	not	always	captured	in	terms	of	different	kinds	of	meaning.	Perry	(1977,	1979),	for	instance,	 argues	 that	 speakers	 uttering	 different	 tokens	 of	 the	 same	 ‘I’-sentence	 express	 different	propositions	but	are	in	the	same	type	of	belief	state.	Evans	(1981)	would	say	that	the	two	speakers	utter	the	sentence	with	the	same	(character-like)	linguistic	meaning	but	have	different	thoughts.	
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for	every	token	of	 ‘I’,	so	there	 is	no	such	thing	as	the	speaker.	We	can	at	best	say	that	every	token	of	‘I’	refers	to	a	speaker	that	produces	it.	The	self-making	view	adds	that	for	something	to	be	a	referent	of	‘I’,	it	is	not	enough	that	it	is	a	speaker;	it	has	to	be	the	best	candidate	for	making	true	the	beliefs	expressed	by	the	speaker’s	‘I’-utterances.	Does	this	imply	that	the	character	of	‘I’	varies	across	speakers	depending	on	whether	the	speaker	has	BIID?	I	do	not	see	why	it	would.	Of	course,	most	of	us	use	‘I’	to	refer	to	a	humanoid,	while	BIID	patients	use	 it	 to	refer	 to	a	proper	part	of	a	humanoid.	However,	 this	does	not	mean	that	we	use	 ‘I’	with	different	characters;	 indeed,	 it	 is	 implausible	that	 ‘I’	has	any	 built-in	 semantic	 restriction	 to	 humanoids.	 Recall	 the	 analogy	 with	 ‘here’	 from	section	 2.	 The	 character	 of	 ‘here’	 is	 usually	 specified	 by	 the	 rule	 that	 it	 picks	 out	 the	speaker’s	 location	 in	 every	 context,	 but	 as	 we	 know,	 there	 are	many	 things	 that	 can	count	as	 the	speaker’s	 location.	This	does	not	 imply	 that	 two	speakers	who	choose	 to	refer	 to	 differently	 sized	 regions	 with	 ‘here’	 are	 using	 the	 word	 with	 different	characters.	Mutatis	mutandis	for	the	self-making	view:	just	because	I	use	the	word	‘I’	for	a	humanoid	and	a	BIID	patient	uses	it	for	a	proper	part	of	a	humanoid,	it	does	not	follow	that	we	use	the	word	with	different	characters.		
6.	Conclusion	In	this	paper	I	canvassed,	admittedly	in	large	brush	strokes,	the	outlines	of	a	promising	alternative	 to	 standard	 versions	 of	 conventionalism:	 persons	 are,	 within	 certain	constraints,	 self-made.	There	are	 reasons	 to	 find	 this	view	attractive,	 and	while	 it	has	some	 surprising	 consequences,	 I	 find	 these	 quite	 liberating,	 rather	 than	 repugnant.	 I	also	considered	several	objections	to	the	view,	none	of	which	seems	compelling.	There	are	many	open	issues	for	future	investigation	which	I	had	no	space	to	get	into	here	but	hope	 to	 discuss	 elsewhere.	 The	 most	 obvious	 one	 is	 the	 question	 of	 diachronic	 self-making:	 do	 people	 have	 a	 say	 in	 how	 long	 and	 under	 what	 conditions	 they	 persist?	While	 the	 self-making	 view	 does	 not	 force	 on	 us	 an	 affirmative	 answer,	 it	 would	 be	natural	for	its	adherents	to	give	one.	In	the	present	work	I	intentionally	focused	on	the	relation	between	persons	and	their	parts	at	a	 time.	The	emerging	picture	offers	novel	and	 interesting	ways	of	 thinking	about	the	metaphysics	of	persons	and	can	be	 further	developed	in	various	directions.	My	present	goal	was	just	to	put	the	self-making	view	on	the	table	and	argue	that	it	deserves	to	be	taken	seriously.31	
                                                31	 For	 invaluable	 discussion	 and	 comments	 on	 several	 earlier	 versions	 of	 this	 paper,	 I	 am	 especially	indebted	 to	 Matti	 Eklund	 and	 Ted	 Sider.	 For	 helpful	 comments	 and	 criticisms	 I	 am	 also	 grateful	 to	Mohammad	Azadpur,	Gábor	Bács,	Karen	Bennett,	Oisín	Deery,	Björn	Eriksson,	Peter	Fazekas,	Alex	Geddes,	Philippe	 Lemoine,	 Peter	 Millican,	 Attila	 Mraz,	 Harold	 Noonan,	 Orsi	 Reich,	 Eric	 Rowe,	 Nico	 Silins,	 Rina	Tzinman,	 Andrea	 Viggiano,	 the	 anonymous	 referees	 and	 editor	 of	 Mind,	 and	 audiences	 at	 the	 2013	Meeting	 of	 the	 Pacific	 APA,	 the	 Central	 European	 University,	 Cornell	 University,	 Stockholm	University,	and	 the	University	of	Oxford.	Writing	 this	paper	 felt	 almost	 like	a	 family	endeavour:	my	 interest	 in	 the	ethics	of	amputation	was	raised	by	my	father	Jozsef	Kovacs,	and	the	idea	to	connect	 it	 to	puzzles	 in	the	metaphysics	of	persons	was	inspired	by	a	conversation	with	my	brother	Adam	Kovacs.	Adam	is	a	dental	technician,	and	he	frequently	encounters	people	who	want	to	get	rid	of	some	of	their	(?)	parts.	
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